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Introduction
On January 1, 1999, Belgium and Italy joined nine other countries in the European Union in the
adoption of the euro.  This simple statement of fact would have been unbelievable to many observers
only a few years ago, and they had reason to be skeptical.  In 1992, the first year after the Treaty of
Maastricht had been signed, Italy’s fiscal position left it far from the Maastricht criteria levels. Its
public debt was over 100% of GDP, and it overshot its estimated budget by L20,000 billion (Felsen
1999, p. 7). Italy’s swift departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the fall of 1992
seemed to seal Italy’s fate outside of EMU.  Belgium similarly faced a miserable budgetary situation
in the same year.  Its deficit finished the year at almost 7% of GDP while its overall public debt was
more than double the Maastricht Treaty’s target level of 60%.
Yet both countries managed remarkable turnarounds.  In November 1996 the Italian lira rejoined
the ERM. By 1997, the fiscal year the European Commission used to make its recommendation to the
Council of Ministers in March 1998 on which countries should join EMU in the first wave, both
countries had satisfied all of the Maastricht criteria but the one that only three of the eleven qualifiers
reached as well, public debt.   Perhaps most surprisingly, Italy brought its yearly budget deficit down
to Germany’s level by 1998 at just 2.7%. Belgium reduced its yearly deficits more or less according
to its publicly announced “Convergence Plan,” and it too cut its deficits below the 3% target level by
1997.
Why did the two European Union countries with the worst debt levels and with yearly deficit
levels double the Maastricht target in 1993 manage to get their financial affairs in shape? This paper
uses an “analytic narrative” approach to answer this question (see Bates et. al., 1998). In section two,
it presents an institutional model to the political economy of budget deficits. The model posits that the
major public finance problem today is a common pool resource problem. Cabinet members are likely
to consider the full consequences of spending for their constituencies as well as the taxation burden on
their constituencies only, leading to higher spending and higher deficits.  There are two institutional
solutions within cabinets to this problem, and their use in turn depends upon the number of parties in
government—strong finance ministers are common in one-party governments and in political systems3
where two clear party blocs oppose each other, while negotiated budget targets in the form of “fiscal
contracts” appear in multi-party governments where clear electoral blocs are not clear.
The third section examines the history of Belgian and Italian public finance during the period
1981-97 to consider the implications of the model. Italy introduced a new electoral system during the
time period.  Consistent with the model, the government soon centralized power around the finance
minister.  These reforms contributed to Italy’s reduction of its budget deficit.  In Belgium the
government introduced fiscal contracts, an expected outcome given the routine multi-party
governments, which largely coincided with the federalization of the country in 1989.  The High
Council of Finance in particular assumed an important role in monitoring and coordinating budget
policies at both the national and the subnational levels once Maastricht was signed. This section also
discusses alternative explanations for budget policy in the two countries, such as whether the number
of party veto players and external pressure from the European Union affected the policies the states
chose. One external actor, the European Union, was important to promote tighter fiscal discipline in
the two countries.  The European Union provided an important stick for any failure to make needed
changes, namely exclusion from EMU. This stick alone, however, was not sufficient to promote
change in both countries. Indeed, both countries made fundamental institutional changes that put the




This paper represents an analytic narrative of how Belgium and Italy qualified for EMU, and
it is important to be clear about this approach, which is developed in Bates et. al. (1998).  Analytic
narratives combine analytic tools common in political science and economics with the narrative form
often used in history. They use rational choice theory to model the processes that cause outcomes.
Rational choice theory dictates that the narrative is concerned with the relevant agents at a given
period of time, and a major task of the author is to determine who is important and who is not.4
Unlike standard versions of rational choice, however, analytic narratives are problem-driven
rather than theory-driven.  The author chooses a model in the hope that it best explains a given event.
By having an explicit model, the author can explain clearly what evidence supports the argument and
what evidence disconfirms it.  The model therefore subjects the author’s argument to close scrutiny.
Moreover, the model also suggests implications that follow if the model is correct. The author hopes
that her model leads to new insights about given outcomes that she may not have developed without
the model.
Analytic narratives expect their authors to ask five questions: 1) do the assumptions fit the
facts; 2) do the conclusions follow from the premises; 3) do implications find confirmation in the
evidence; 4) how well does the theory stand up by comparison with other explanations, and 5) is the
explanation generalizable and applicable to other cases (Bates et. al. 1998, pp. 16-18.)  This section
first develops the model and the model’s implications and answers question 2.  It also provides
alternative explanations.  The empirical section asks explicitly questions’ 1, 3, and 4, while the
conclusion considers question 5.
The Governmental Stage of the Budget Process and the Importance of Electoral
Systems
This section presents a theory for the making of budgets within governments, which is based
on Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999. The model focuses on decision-making within cabinets at the
national level, and in particular on the ministers in the government who formulate the budget.
Especially among the parliamentary systems that exist in Western Europe, there is good reason to
focus on the government rather than on other institutions. Either a single political party or a group of
parties composes a government, and it is the government’s responsibility to pass the budget.  Party
discipline is generally high, and in most cases the parliament passes the government’s budget mostly
unchanged in Europe’s parliamentary systems.  It therefore makes some sense to focus on policy-
making with cabinets for European countries.  Of course, to the extent that parliament is sovereign it
must be included in the analysis, and parliament’s role will be considered explicitly in the empirical
section.5
Within governments there are generally two levels of negotiation—those made between
members of the same party, and those made among political parties. This difference is important;
members of the same political party generally have policy preferences that are fairly close, and they
expect to run together in future elections.  Members of different parties, in contrast, usually have
policy preferences that differ from their coalition partners, and they may run against their coalition
partners. One should know how many party actors exist in the cabinet before discussing the
negotiations themselves.
An important determinant of the number of party actors is the electoral system.  As Duverger
(1954) illustrated half a century ago, plurality systems generally lead to a two-party system, and
countries with such electoral systems are therefore likely to have one-party majority governments.
Proportional representation (PR) systems have more variation in their district magnitudes, though the
magnitudes are always larger than those found in plurality systems.  They tend to have a larger
number of  “effective” parties in parliament, and they are likely to be characterized by multi-party
majority or either one-party or multi-party minority governments (Lijphart 1984, 161; Lijphart (1994);
and Taagepera and Shugart (1989 and 1993).  Neto and Cox (1997) add a definitive twist. The effects
of pre-existing social cleavages and electoral institutions on the effective number of parties, and hence
on the likelihood of one-party or multi-party governments, is multiplicative.  The electoral system
therefore sets an upper bound.  Plurality will usually lead to two-party systems, but the number of
parties in a PR state ultimately depends on the number of underlying social cleavages, such as
regional, ethnic, or income divides.
Conceptually the number of party actors in government can be treated as “veto players.”   The
number of veto players is equal to the number of actors (usually parties) whose consent is needed for
any bill to become law (Tsebelis 1995). Tsebelis (1995) demonstrates that governments with fewer
veto players are able to engender change faster and with greater depth than governments with more
veto players. The higher the number of veto players, the harder it is for the players to reach agreement
to pass laws, and the greater the chance that the status quo will be maintained. Several empirical6
studies are consistent with this result.1 Tsebelis (1995), citing empirical evidence provided by Schick
(1993), argues explicitly that increasing the number of veto players increases the size of budget
deficits. When just one veto player exists in the government, decisions are more easily reached on the
budget than when more than one player can block the budget, and fiscal discipline is consequently
more rigid with one veto player than with more than one.
Knowledge of the number of party veto players, however, can only be the starting point for
unraveling the link between institutions and the health of the budget. First, the veto player literature
makes the important simplifying assumption that parties are unified actors.  In a typical cabinet,
however, members of the same party may argue bitterly about the final shape of the budget.  As the
next section demonstrates, such disagreements are likely even if the players hold the same general
spending preferences as long as they represent different constituencies in the debate.  This observation
leads to a more general point, namely that all types of government require some coordination of the
budget-making process if they wish to maintain fiscal discipline.  The next section also argues that the
number of veto players does affect how the actors can provide necessary coordination, but it is the
absence or presence of the coordination, rather than the number of veto players per se, that determines
the level of fiscal discipline.  Even one-party governments can have systematic problems with debt
based on the type of institutions they use to reach agreement on the yearly budget.
The Fiefdom Approach
The structure of the bargaining process within the cabinet affects the size of the budget.  If
spending ministers are left to determine their own budgets, they will select amounts that are larger
than what is collectively optimal for the government in power.  The reason for this outcome is that the
budget process resembles a common pool resource problem.
Consider first the budgeting decision of spending ministers in a given cabinet.  A spending
minister is responsible for the expenditures of her department, but in bidding for funds she takes into
account only that part of the excess burden of taxation that falls on her constituency.  An agriculture
                                               
1 See Kreppel 1997, Hallerberg and Basinger 1998, and Tsebelis Forthcoming.7
minister, for instance, will be most concerned about the services and goods she can provide to farmers
and about the taxes that those farmers must pay.2  In a completely decentralized budget process each
spending minister bids for funds maximizing her utility given the bids of the other spending ministers.
If the decision-making rule is simply that the individual bids are aggregated to form a total budget,
then spending ministers determine the budget level for their ministry. Individual ministers are
responsible for making decisions in their own “fiefdoms.”  They set policy and budgets on their turf
without much explicit interference from other ministers, including the prime minister.3
A “fiefdom” approach will lead to both higher spending and higher deficits because it
promotes the common pool resource (CPR) problem of budgeting.  It is important to note that this
outcome holds even if the ministers possess identical spending preferences—it is the difference in the
consideration of the tax burden that drives the result.4  Ministers represent distinct constituencies.
Individual spending ministers disregard the externality resulting from the common revenue fund.  The
common pool resource problem also results in higher spending as well as higher deficits and debts.5
It should be noted that the players would be better off if they all considered the entire tax burden, but,
in the absence of any overt coordination, they individually do better if they consider only the tax
burden on their respective constituencies.
A large literature has developed examining the conditions under which the players choose to
cooperate with each other in such situations.6  All of these solutions involve the use of selective
punishments or incentives and the monitoring of the actors.  In the next sub-section I discuss domestic
institutional mechanisms to achieve a cooperative solution and reach budget decisions that are closer
to the one that is collectively optimal for the government. The first approach involves delegation: one
member of the government is vested with special strategic powers that allow him to achieve a
                                               
2 While this example discusses discretionary spending, it is also applicable to entitlement spending as well.  The
important point is that a minister considers the benefits of spending and the costs of taxation fully only for a
subsection of a given party’s supporters.
3 The assumption that a given minister wholly determines policy for her ministry is standard in models of
coalition formation.  The best example is Laver and Shepsle (1996).
4 For a more formal treatment of the common pool problem in cabinets see Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999).
5 A formal proof of the relationship between the CPR problem and higher deficits in a multi-period game is
found in Velasco (1999) as well as in [names withheld].8
cooperative solution. The second approach involves commitment to fiscal targets: playing a
cooperative bargaining game at the outset of the budgeting process to agree on the main budgetary
parameters allows one to reach the same goal.
Delegation to a Strong Finance Minister and Commitment to Fiscal Contracts
With delegation, governments lend authority to a "fiscal entrepreneur," whose function is to
assure that all actors cooperate.  To be effective, this entrepreneur must have the ability to monitor the
others, possess selective incentives that he can use to punish defectors and/or reward those who
cooperate, and have some motivation to bear the costs of monitoring himself.7  Among the relevant
cabinet members, the finance minister often plays the role of this entrepreneur.  His interests generally
coincide with the general interests.  He has the responsibility to coordinate the formation of the
budget, and, fair or not, the size of the budget deficit is often the principal indicator that others use to
judge his effectiveness.  Finally, the finance minister's staff gives him the means to monitor the actions
of the other ministries, and, since his prestige and hence his personal benefits depend on the
effectiveness of his ministry, he has a private incentive to guarantee that the monitoring occurs.  The
only question is whether the finance minister has the power to offer selective incentives and/or
punishments to the spending ministers.
One practical way to execute delegation is for the finance minister to serve as an agenda setter
in the cabinet meeting where budget decisions are being made. The finance minister has the right to
make the first proposal for the budget, and he has the power to constrain any amendments that the
spending ministers might submit to his proposal.  The finance minister’s power as an agenda setter can
be measured in terms of the utility his proposal must leave to the spending ministers in order not to be
overruled. The stronger he is, the closer the outcome these negotiations must be to his ideal budget.
The larger the finance minister’s agenda-setting power, the closer the deficit comes to the collectively
optimal outcome.
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Olson (1965); Hardin (1982); Ostrom (1990); Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994).
7 Olson (1965); Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1978); Cox and McCubbins (1993).9
In contrast, under commitment the government agrees to a set of fiscal targets collectively
negotiated at the start of the budgeting process. The emphasis here is on the multilateral nature of the
negotiations.  Coalition partners negotiate the budgets earmarked for different ministries regardless of
which party ultimately selects the head of the ministry.  This means, for example, that, while a Social
Democrat may become the Defense Minister and a Green the Environmental Minister, negotiations
among the respective parties determine the budget for both ministers.  This practice contrasts with the
fiefdom approach where the two ministers would set their respective budgets more or less alone.  The
commitment approach therefore forces all participants to consider the full tax burden created by
additional spending.
This discussion above suggests the availability of two institutional approaches,  delegation and
commitment to negotiated budget targets, to overcome the deficit bias in public budgeting. The
number of party veto players affects the selection of one or the other institution.  Delegation is usually
the proper approach for governments that have just one veto player, but difficult for governments with
more than one veto player.  Commitment is the proper approach for multi-veto player governments but
more difficult to achieve for single veto player governments.
Members of the same political party likely hold similar political perspectives. The players
therefore share the same views regarding the distribution of funds over the various departments, and
conflicts of interest among members of the same political party arise primarily from the common pool
problem.8 In a one-party government the different ministers can be fairly sure that the finance minister
holds more or less the same spending preferences as they do, and they can trust that their agent will
consider the entire tax burden and hence solve the common pool resource problem.
In a coalition government, in contrast, the matter is more complex.  Cabinet members have
different views regarding the distribution of government spending over the groups of recipients if
their party’s preferences differ significantly from their coalition partners. Agreement on a budget,
therefore, involves a compromise between the coalition partners regarding the distribution of funds
                                               
8 Laver and Shepsle (1994, 9-10), for instance, in summarizing the findings of the case studies in their edited
volume, note that the distribution of portfolios among members of the same political party has little effect on the
policies which the government adopts. Much more important is the distribution of portfolios among different
parties.10
for a given budget size. Delegating agenda setting powers to the finance minister now becomes more
difficult, as the latter necessarily is a member of one of the coalition parties himself. Delegation then
creates a principal-agent problem. The members of the other parties in the coalition suspect that the
finance minister will abuse his strategic powers to shift the distribution of transfers in the budget
towards his own preferred distribution, at the cost of the recipients favored more strongly by
themselves. These members will, therefore, be reluctant to vest the finance minister with strong
agenda-setting powers. But, with limited agenda-setting powers, the finance minister becomes unable
to achieve the collectively optimal decision. It is important to note here that the principal-agent
problem is exacerbated when the political parties expect to run against each other in future elections.
When they anticipate that they will be an electoral block that wins or loses together, the principal-
agent problem is less relevant.
The same principal agent problem does not arise in the case of commitment to fiscal targets,
since all cabinet members negotiate the targets.  Thus, governments with two or more veto players are
more likely to opt for the commitment approach, and this will be true the more different the initial
policy positions are of the coalition partners.
A second issue involves the consequences of a defection. Here, the important distinction is
between ministers who expect to run together in the next election and ministers who expect that their
parties will run campaigns against each other.  In the latter case, overspending by an individual
minister from one party in the coalition implies a redistribution of public spending away from the
other parties, and, therefore, implies a cost of political support for the other parties in the coalition.
The nature of the game then includes a new level of complexity.  Any defection can increase the
chances of one party winning the elections and hurt the chances of another.  In the case where the
parties anticipate running together, however, excessive spending simply hurts the coalition.  It is
therefore possible to delegate power to a finance minister when the parties will stand together in the
next election.  Any attempt on the finance minister’s part to undermine a particular minister or party of
a minister will, in the end, undermine her own chances of winning the next election.
Third, the punishments that may be levied if given players are caught breaking the budgetary
contract also differ across the two budgetary approaches. In the delegation case, the ultimate11
punishment is dismissal from office. In the case of commitment, a defecting minister cannot be
dismissed easily by the prime minister if a coalition partner supports its minister.  The most important
punishment mechanism here is the threat that the coalition breaks up if a spending minister reneges on
the budget agreement. Thus, punishment leads to the death of the government rather than the dismissal
of a single individual.
For a single-party government, in contrast, the enforcement mechanism of the commitment
approach is rather weak. Consider, for example, a single-party government with a weak prime and
finance minister.  If this government negotiated an agreement on a set of fiscal contracts at the outset
of the budget process and an individual spending minister reneges on the agreement during the
implementation phase, the other cabinet members cannot credibly threaten the defector with
dissolution of the government.  They would punish themselves by calling for elections. Without a
credible threat at the outset, the entire cabinet would just walk away from the initial agreement.
The issue of punishment is also critical for the consideration of when ministers will agree
either to delegation to a strong finance minister or to fiscal contracts.  If the punishment cannot be
credibly enforced, cabinet members have no incentive to cooperate with any agreements they make. In
one-party governments, this credibility is missing if certain cabinet members are viewed as
irreplaceable.  In Japan, for example, every faction of the LDP must be represented in an LDP
government, and the prime minister is often weaker than the faction leaders within his own cabinet.  In
coalition governments, such fiscal institutions will fail if there are parties that cannot be excluded from
future coalitions.  These parties correspond to Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) strong parties, that is,
parties that cannot be excluded from any possible coalition.
The model therefore yields several testable hypotheses:
Hypotheses Related to Institutional Choice:
H1: States with coalition governments where coalition parties expect to run against each other in
future elections will opt for either fiscal contracts or fiefdom.
H2: States with one party governments, or states where there are clear electoral blocks where
coalition partners win or lose elections together, will opt for either delegation to a strong finance
minister or fiefdom.
H3: The fiscal institution will not be durable if the punishment mechanism for defectors is not
credible.12
Hypothesis Related to Institutional Performance:
H4: States without either delegation to a strong finance minister or fiscal contracts are fiefdom
states. They will have, all else equal, higher deficits than if they had used one of the two
institutions.
 Empirical evidence from Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999 provides statistical tests for H1, H2
and H4.  They argue both that the number of veto players affects institutional choice as well as that the
institutional constraints on the CPR problem have a real effect on the size of deficits.  They examine
the budget institutions and the fiscal performance of the EU 15 for the time period 1981-94.  In a test
of H1, they find that of the twelve states that had two or more veto players and that were consequently
predicted to use fiscal contracts, eight of them used contracts and three used no institutional solution to
the CPR problem.  In support of H2, of the three states predicted to use delegation, two did and one
chose no institutional solution. Pooled time series regressions provide evidence for H4, namely that it
is the absence or presence of these fiscal institutions, rather than the number of veto players per se,
that affects the size of the deficit, with states with one of these fiscal institutions having higher deficits
than those that did not.9
Yet Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999 do not trace the development of these institutions over
time in any detail, which is a common restriction in statistical studies.  They also provide no
discussion of H3.  They therefore do not explain why some states use these institutions and others do
not.  Another problem in the article is that, by ending the analysis at 1994, they miss the critical time
period 1995-97 when several European Union states managed to get their deficits in order. Indeed,
based on their framework, both Italy and Belgium were good examples of the “fiefdom” approach and
should not have qualified for EMU.  This paper fills many of the gaps of Hallerberg and von Hagen
1999 through more detailed study of two important cases, Belgium and Italy.
                                               
9 The regressions control for macroeconomic conditions, and they examine other political variables considered
to be important, such as partisanship and a change in the government in a given year.13
Alternative Theoretical Approaches
Before proceeding further, one should address alternative explanations for budget policy in
Belgium and Italy. Like in the present study, some writers focus on the effects of electoral systems on
public finance, and these electoral institutionalists  assert that the proportional representation systems
result in high levels of public debt.  Proportional representation leads to indecisive governments, a
higher turnover of cabinets, and greater polarization of the political system, which lead, in turn, to
governments that are not able to handle crises (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina and Perotti 1995;
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997) and cabinet ministers who do not consider the future implications
of their actions because they do not expect to remain in power (Persson and Svensson 1989; Roubini
and Sachs 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991; Hahm 1994).
These arguments are closely related to the veto player literature (Tsebelis 1995). So long as Belgium
and Italy maintained proportional representation systems, one would expect them to have difficulties
reducing their budget deficits. Any movement to a plurality electoral system, however, would lead to
more decisiveness within cabinets and longer-lasting governments that could handle the difficult task
of enforcing budget discipline.  Given that the two countries reduced their deficits significantly, one
would expect a move to plurality in both states at some point before they met the Maastricht criteria
on deficits.
A second alternative focuses on the role of external actors, and in particular on the role of
world markets. Some authors argue that, in a world of greater capital mobility, it is more difficult for
states to run budget deficits because markets will punish lax states (Garrett and Lange 1991, Simmons
1998; for contrary evidence see Oatley 1999).  With regard to Belgium and Italy, each country had
substantial public debts that needed capital for their financing, and capital may have dried up had the
states remained outside of EMU and outside of the new “core” of the EU.  Strong pressure from
another external actor, the European Union, also played a pivotal role according to this view.  Markets
followed closely both public pronouncements and private leaks from Brussels, and the European
Union institutions responsible for overseeing the states’ progress on deficits, such as ECOFIN and
Directorate General II of the European Commission, mindful of their influence on the markets, used
the markets to apply pressure on intransigent states.  The financial penalty for missing the euro boat,14
therefore, could have been severe in both counties.10  For this model to hold, one would expect that
government bond interest rates would have increased noticeably whenever it seemed likely that a
country would not make it into EMU. These rates would presumably have been higher than rates in
the country before Maastricht.
Figure 2: Comparison of Belgian and Italian Gross Debt Levels 1970-1997
The Cases of Belgium and Italy 1980-97: Do the facts support the model?
Overview
Both Belgium and Italy represent important case studies to determine whether changes in
budgetary institutions contributed to their fiscal turnarounds.  Together they constituted the two
countries with the most serious budget situations when the Treaty of Maastricht was agreed to in
December 1991.  As Figure 2 illustrates, Belgium got into trouble already in the late 1970’s, but its
                                               
10 This argument is especially prevalent in the popular press; see, for example, “Italy’s Turn to Make Waves,”














debt level ballooned in the early 1980’s and did not decline with any regularity until the mid-1990’s.
Italy’s debt level increased more gradually but also more steadily through the 1980’s.  Like Belgium,
its debt started to decline in the mid-1990’s as well.
The following section considers first the electoral and fiscal institutions that existed in the two
countries during the period 1981-94 for Italy and 1980-90 for Belgium. Italy presents an especially
strong example to test both the theory developed here and the electoral institutionalist approach—it is
the only EU country in the last 20 years to make a significant change to its electoral system and then
to stick by that change for at least one additional election, long enough for the change to have an
effect on the corresponding fiscal institutions.11  Before the electoral reform was introduced in 1994,
the country had maintained a fairly traditional system based on proportional representation.  The new
electoral law introduced a “mixed” system based both on plurality for 75% of the seats and PR for
25%.  This change made the system somewhat like the German electoral system, and the expectation
would be that the possible fiscal institutions would come to resemble the German case as well, that is,
that delegation to a strong finance minister in the presence of two clear electoral blocks would be the
likely solution to the common pool resource problem.
Narrative I: Italian Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, 1981-92
                                                                                                                                                 
ground here.  Either Italy makes it and Italian bonds converge towards German bonds, or Italy doesn’t and
bonds go stratospheric.  It’s a binary game.” For a contrary view see Mosley (1999).
11 France also made a significant change to its system in 1986 when it moved from a 2-stage plurality system to
PR, but in the next election held just two years later the country switched back to the old system.  The new
system did not exist long enough to have a real impact on budgetary institutions.  Similarly, Greece has fiddled
with its system, but in all cases the district magnitude has remained relatively low, and there was not a major
shift from one type of system to another like there was in Italy.16
Before the first elections under the electoral reform in 1994 Italy used a two-tier proportional
representation system.  Seats were awarded in fairly large constituencies, and a second allocation of
seats was done to smooth out any great discrepancies from the first round.  The allocation of seats was
therefore relatively proportional to the proportion of votes cast for parties. An important feature of the
system was that voters could express their preferences for specific candidates on the party lists.
Based on this electoral system, one would expect that Italy would usually have multi-party
coalition governments, and such governments were indeed the norm in post-war Italy. During the
1980’s there were a series of coalition governments composed of five parties (the pentapartito).
These five “veto players” were required to approve the budget, and with so many veto players
delegation of fiscal powers to a finance minister was clearly infeasible.  It was unlikely that the four
parties that did not receive the finance minister’s portfolio would be able to trust the one party that did
to monitor and enforce the budget fairly.
H2 predicts that delegation to a strong finance minister would not have been a likely
budgetary institution, and in fact the finance minister was weak relative to other ministers. Three
ministries (treasury, budget, and finance) participated in the budget formulation stage.  Consequently,
while there were some negotiations between the finance minister and the individual spending
ministers, the negotiations were not that regulated.12  A possible alternative to the finance minister as
fiscal entrepreneur is the prime minister, but in Italy the prime minister was weak as well—
constitutionally he had little control over individual ministers, and in practice he neither selected nor
appointed the spending ministers (Pitruzzello 1997).
The alternative for Italy that, incidentally, had worked quite well with five parties in Finland
was negotiation of fiscal contracts. These contracts, however, were not put in place. Spending
ministers enjoyed a remarkable level of independence and autonomy.
H3 predicts that fiscal contracts will not work in the absence of credible punishment
mechanisms, and indeed, such mechanisms were lacking.  The principle way to sanction a party that
overspends in a commitment framework is to exclude the party from the coalition and to find a new
                                               
12 Alesina, Mare, and Perotti (1995) as cited in DeHaan, Moessen, and Volkerink (1999), p. 294.17
partner.  In the Netherlands, for example, party alliances are fluid, and one party can credibly threaten
another to refuse to ally with it if it reneges on a promise. In contrast, in Italy it was difficult to make
similar threats. One party, the Christian Democrats (DC), simply could not be left out of any coalition.
They held the Center of the political spectrum, and a coalition without them was not possible.  In
Laver and Shepsle’s (1996) terms, the DC was a strong party. No party could credibly threaten the
Christian Democrats as long as the political system remained in force.  Similarly, it was difficult for
the DC to threaten the other parties in the coalition because it also had few alternatives to choose
from.13  With many parliamentary seats going to extremist parties who were not considered
koalitionsfähig, and whose share of seats reached as high as 40% of the total in the early 1970s, there
were few alternative coalition possibilities (Strøm 1990, 160). The result was that the parties could
not credibly threaten to leave a current coalition partner out of a future government if that party
reneged on its agreement. A commitment to fiscal contracts was therefore out of the question.
The expectation from H4 from the composition of the fiscal institutions was fiscal laxity.
Indeed, during the period the gross debt level as a percent of GDP more than doubled from 60% in
1981 to 125% in 1994 (Statistical Annex of European Economy).
Before moving on, one should note that Italy did begin one crucial reform, namely the
reworking of the financing of local governments during this period, in 1992.  Before the 1990’s the
central government financed localities almost exclusively through grants.  Politicians in these
localities had no incentives to save the government any money because they had no control over the
raising of taxes that financed them. Moreover, the central government’s willingness to bail out
insolvent municipalities was a common, and repeated practice.  In budgetary terms, these bailouts
affected the gross debt levels only and not the yearly deficits.  The reforms hardened the budget
constraint through increases in the localities’ financial autonomy as well as through the introduction
of cash controls on local expenditure (Bordignon 1999).
                                               
13 This is not to say that parties did not threaten each other and dissolve governments; indeed, the opposite was
the case.  The issue, however, is whether one party could exclude another in future coalitions as punishment for
a given act.  The reality for many years was that there were reshuffles in the Italian cabinet of individuals but
not of parties, and even the individuals had a tendency to reappear again and again, but simply in different
positions.18
Yet, as will be developed later in the paper, these reforms by themselves did not solve Italy’s
problems, and one can exaggerate their importance.  The mere fact that the locality debt forgiveness
did not enter into yearly debt calculations meant that the reform cannot explain why Italy got its
deficit below 3% of GDP.  Instead, it took a fundamental reorganization of budgetary institutions at
the national level to meet the Maastricht targets.
Belgium Public Finance 1981-89
Belgian fiscal policy also resembled a classic case of the fiefdom approach in the 1980’s.  It
used a proportional representation electoral system with multiple cleavages in society, including most
importantly a language divide between Flemings and Walloons, and, as Neto and Cox (1997) would
predict, coalition governments with several parties were common.  Successive governments attempted
to set spending targets, as indeed one would expect given coalition governments, but these targets
failed.  It took a fairly radical solution, namely the passage of constitutional reforms that moved
Belgium from a unitary to a federal state, to begin to break the institutional impasse. It was not until
the strengthening of one fiscal institution in particular, the High Council of Finance, as well as the
establishment of the Maastricht criteria that Belgium finally turned the corner.
In practice, Belgian cabinets in the early 1980’s tried to introduce budgetary targets as one
would expect under a coalition government, confirming H1, but the targets failed miserably.  The
situation was especially dire during the period 1981-83, when the debt level literally doubled and
interest payments increased from 10% to 17% of the total budget (Smits 1985).  The governments in
power in the early 1980’s took two steps.  First, they asked for, and received from, the parliament in
successive years “special powers,” which allowed the government to pass decrees on budget and other
economically important areas without approval from parliament.  Second, they agreed to different
budgetary targets in an effort to get their deficits under control.
The situation that faced the newly elected (although not new) Prime Minister, Martens, in
1985 was emblematic of the problems facing any attempt to cut expenditures. During the coalition
negotiations after the fall elections the future Prime Minister at first tried to write budget cuts of BF19
70 billion into the coalition agreement.  Yet the future coalition partners could not at first agree on
this amount. The reports of the sitting Budget and Finance Ministers indicated that the amount was
BF 20 billion too little because of a shortfall in income, while the likely Minister of Economic Affairs
wanted to spend more money on the coal sector in both Wallonia and in Flanders. Moreover, during
the negotiations, the sitting Ministers of Education still awarded contracts for the building of schools
even though there was a moratorium on new school construction emerging in the formation
agreement.  At first Martens simply dropped any reference to cuts in the coalition agreement, but the
deal that emerged in the final document was to cut 200 billion francs without any details about how
these cuts would be enforced.
During the negotiations on the budget the next year, it at first appeared that this pledge would
be kept.  The cabinet agreed to reduce spending by BF 195 billion in May 1985, which, the Prime
Minister asserted, meant that the government had met its goal.  Yet even within that year the targets
did not hold up.  The Francophone Education Minister refused to make the serious cuts allocated to
him with the assertion that the number of students was increasing; at no time did he provide actual
figures of the number of students under his jurisdiction.  The government also weakened, and in some
cases it abandoned entirely, several planned cuts, including in unemployment compensation and
pension funding.   Individual spending ministers for their part did not bother to take seriously their
requirement to have their budgets approved by parliament, and by the end of 1986 not a single fiscal
year 1986 budget of an individual ministry had been approved, even though in theory they were
supposed to be passed before the end of 1985. Jozef Smits summed up the sentiment directed towards
the new government that had promised real spending reductions: “not only the opposition parties, but
also spokesmen for the majority parties expressed their dissatisfaction with the little care the
Government was showing about budget orthodoxy (Smits 1987, p. 373).”  In the end, the government
missed its budget target for 1986 by 2.9% of GNP.
A further problem was the inability of regional groups to exclude one another from any
special help from the federal government.  The cleavage between Flemish-speaking Flanders and
French-speaking Wallonia complicates enormously the conduct of politics in the country, and, by
extension, of fiscal policy.  Different levels of economic development overlap the traditional cultural20
divide, and indeed the economic cleavage has existed for most of the history of the comparatively
young country founded in 1830.  While in the 19
th century Wallonia was the more economically
advanced part of Belgium, by the 1980’s the disparity had reversed to favor more service-friendly
Flanders.  It was therefore difficult to coordinate cuts in spending for one or the other group.
A classic case comes from the federal government’s bailout of four municipalities in the early
1980’s that hurt the federal budget. Liège had more or less fallen into default, and the federal
government felt obligated to bail out the city.  It assumed the city’s debts on condition that the city
pay it back over 30 years and that it agree to a restructuring plan.  Luckily for the politics of the issue,
a corresponding city in Flanders, Antwerp, had similar fiscal problems to the Wallonian city, and the
federal government concluded a similar agreement with this city located on the German border as
well.  Yet the debt levels still did not match.  To assure that the federal government was not showing
favors to one of the regions over the other, it also “bailed out” two additional cities, Ghent and
Charleroi, whose finances were nowhere near as troubled as the other two cities. The result was a
significant increase in the debt burden on the federal government.14
H3 predicts that the punishment mechanism must have been lacking if the fiscal contracts
failed, and indeed the most significant problem in the 1980’s was the inability of coalition partners to
punish “defectors” who overspent their targets.  It is striking how similar Belgium was to Italy.  Like
in the Italian case, it was virtually impossible for new coalition governments to exclude the centrist
Christian Democrats from power. From 1958 to 1999 every coalition government included this
centrist party. 15  Moreover, every coalition had to have representatives from both Flanders and
Wallonia.  To the extent that fiscal issues centered on this ethnic divide, the punishment mechanism
was again absent.
The expectation from H4 of this institutional set-up was, like the Italian case, fiscal laxity,
and indeed the overall debt burden worsened throughout the period. From 1980 to 1988 the gross debt
burden shot up from 78% to 133% (see Figure 2).
                                               
14 Interview at the Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, July 9, 1998
15 Indeed, it took the dioxin scandal in summer 1999 to chase the Christian Democrats finally from power.21
A partial solution to the second problem, namely the regional conflict between the Flemings
and the Walloons, was to decentralize the country.  After elections in 1988 it was initially not possible
for parties from the two regions to form a new coalition government.  The future Christian
Democratic Prime Minister, Jean-Luc Dehaene, agreed to accept King Baudouin’s offer to attempt to
form a new government, but only if he could negotiate what amounted to changes in the organization
of the state itself.
For two weeks fifteen men representing five political parties bargained with each other and
established a new constitutional order. 16 What was most important for fiscal policy was the transfer
of powers to the regions. From 1989 on, the three regions assumed responsibility over all so-called
“territorial policies,” such as public infrastructure, special employment practices, public works,
agriculture, and the like.  The three Communities for their part assumed responsibility over the big-
ticket item of education.17 These bodies received half of their funding from a fixed share of national
taxes and some minor taxes they imposed themselves and half from federal government grants.  In
total, overnight the share of public budget devoted to the regions increased from 8.4% to 33%
(Hooghe 1991).
This transfer of competencies did not solve the problems the two nationalities had with one
another, but it did relieve pressure (at least for a few years) on their demands on the federal
government.  The funding structure guaranteed that the regions always got the money promised them,
even in the midst of economic recessions, meaning that the federal budget would bear the full effects
of any revenue shortfalls.  The full debt burden also remained with the federal government. Yet this
                                               
16 The bargaining would be a fascinating topic for a dissertation in public choice.  One of the fifteen persons
who was in the room related the following story to me.  All negotiations were conducted with the use of
spreadsheets that set out the implications of different proposals.  At first Mr. Dehaene wanted to negotiate in n
dimensions, but this was not possible because the negotiators could not understand what it is that they were
gaining or giving up, so they refused at first to support any change at all.  Dehaene then broke down the
negotiations into 2-3 dimensional spaces.  This allowed compromises to be struck.  After all of the 2-3
dimensional spaces were finished, everything already agreed to was put into one package. I would guess that
this is the only time where people writing a new constitutional order literally compared different spread sheets,
not just documents.
17 To keep the levels of government straight, the regions are based on territory and there are now three:
Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels (the last with somewhat reduced powers in comparison with the other two
regions.) The three Communities, on the other had, are based on language—Flemish, French, and German.  One
nuance that is relevant in budget policy is that the Flemish Community and the Flanders region are one, while22
change did not resolve the problems within the national government, and there were temptations for
the regional governments to create excessive deficits of their own á la the Italian model. Clearly more
institutional change was needed to prevent this reform from exacerbating Belgium’s fiscal problems.
The Role of the European Union
The Treaty of Maastricht laid out the procedures for the measures EU states would need to
take to qualify for participation in EMU.  It also detailed the formal role of European Union
institutions.  The EU was important because it provided the important stick usually missing in both
Italian and Belgian finance to coalition partners who regularly ignored the broader budgetary effects
of their decisions.  To a lesser extent, the EU also provided monitoring of the progress of the states
towards greater fiscal discipline.
In fiscal policy there were two important reference values—yearly deficits no larger than 3%
of GDP and total gross debt no larger than 60% of GDP.  Moreover, these figures were for general
government, not just the central government. This provision meant that all levels of government,
including city, region, and central government, were included.  While central governments were
expected to coordinate the effort to reach these targets, they would not be allowed simply to transfer
their debts to another level of government.  There was some debate in the years leading up to the
decision on who would participate on the “absoluteness” of these reference values.  The Treaty itself
notes in Article 104c that if a ratio has “declined substantially and continuously” it would be enough
to qualify a country for EMU, but in practice this looser definition was used only for the gross debt
levels.  The 3% figure was more absolute. States had to qualify under the Maastricht criteria in the
reference year of 1997.  States that did not fulfill the criteria would be left out of the first wave of
EMU.  The European Union therefore had set externally pre-defined budgetary targets as well as a
clear deadline when they had to be met.  As one official at Directorate General II of the European
Commission put it, “the setting of a specific deadline concentrated people’s minds.”18
                                                                                                                                                 
this is not the case for the French Community and Wallonia. The exact overlap for the Flemings gives them
somewhat more flexibility in budgeting.
18 Interview at DG II, July 30, 1999.23
The Treaty of Maastricht also instructed the European Commission to prepare a report on
each country that it thought was running an excessive deficit, and the completed report was then
referred to the Council for a vote under qualified majority on whether an excessive deficit indeed
existed in a given country. Structurally, Directorate General II (Economic and Financial Affairs) had
country desks staffed with bureaucrats whose job was to monitor economic developments, and, since
the publication of the Werner Report in 1970, which had recommended monetary unification by 1980,
these desks had also monitored fiscal policy. Together with their superiors the country specialists
drafted the reports on the individual countries. This procedure was a precursor of the formal vote on
which countries would qualify for EMU, for no state judged as possessing an “excessive deficit”
would be allowed into the club.
This procedure therefore gave the Commission a formal role in monitoring the budgetary
health of all countries. It also provided a yearly reminder within Ecofin (the meeting of the
Economics and Finance Ministers) and more broadly in the domestic and international press to states
that were not meeting the deficit that they were running out of time to get their act together. Indeed,
the Commission was not shy in expressing its opinion—in its first assessment, which was completed
in 1994, it found that 10 of 12 EU members were burdened with “excessive deficits.”
The Commission also played a role in monitoring the “convergence programs” that member
states submitted to it.  These plans were to detail how the given state intended to qualify for EMU.
The Commission for its part then offered private opinions to both the Council and to the country on
the feasibility of the plans.  Yet the effectiveness of this procedure was more limited.  Countries were
under no obligation to submit such programs, and at first there were also no guidelines for what the
programs that were submitted should contain.  The first Irish program, for example, which was meant
to explain how Ireland would qualify for EMU several years down the road, had only three numbers
in the entire text and was so vague that it was difficult to understand exactly what steps the country
would take.19  The Commission eventually did set guidelines for the Programs in 1994 and it
                                               
19 Interview at DG II, July 14, 1999.24
encouraged states to prepare yearly programs for evaluation, but in practice only the states that were
doing well anyway bothered to submit updated versions.20
In sum, the Commission was able to judge whether a country had hit the target levels, but it
had virtually no impact on how the states were to reach those levels.  Domestic institutional changes
in Italy and Belgium would play the key role in assuring that the EU’s stick of exclusion from EMU
was not used against them.  The European Union’s definition of debt, which was based on general
government debt instead of just central government debt, also directed attention to the regions, states,
and localities in the member states.
Italian Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, 1994-97
Italy used a new electoral system for the first time in the 1994 elections. It represented a move
away from proportional representation towards a plurality system. In both the Chamber of Deputies
and in the Senate 3/4 of the members were elected through plurality and 1/4 through PR.  In the vote
for the Chamber of Deputies, the preference vote for candidates was abolished, parties had complete
autonomy over their lists that existed at the national level, and individuals voted twice—once for an
individual and once for a party.  The vote in the Senate differed because individuals voted just once
for a given candidate, and the party affiliation of the individual was used to determine the PR seats on
a regional, instead of national, level (Katz 1996).
These changes were expected to lead to bi-polarity in electoral alliances, and, as H1 and H2
predict, the existence of such alliances should have important consequences for the type of fiscal
institutions that are possible at the governmental stage in Italy.  Examples come from France and
Germany.  In France, the UDF allies almost exclusively with the RPR while the Socialist Party works
equally as often with the French Communist Party, while in Germany during most of the last two
decades the FDP and the CDU/CSU confronted the SPD and the Greens.  In both cases delegation to a
strong finance minister is feasible because the political parties in the coalition consider the electoral
                                               
20 This was changed under the Stability and Growth Pact.  All states are now required to submit their programs,
either in the form of stability programs (states taking part in EMU) or in the form of convergence programs25
success of their coalition partners as important for their continued occupation of government
(Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999). According to H2, the existence of two opposing blocks should
have made delegation to a strong finance minister the solution to the CPR problem instead of fiscal
contracts.
Indeed, Italy moved in exactly this direction institutionally, albeit not as directly as many
observers would have liked.  One problem that arose was that a clean bi-polar system did not develop
as quickly nor as thoroughly as it exists in contemporary France and Germany.  During the 1994
electoral campaign, the allies of Forza Italia varied, while the AN ran against the Polo della Liberta,
its supposed national partner, in some regions (Katz 1996).  Not surprisingly, the Berlusconi
government that brought these parties and others together was unstable and lasted a short seven
months before falling in December 1994.  This result is consistent with both H2 and H3.  First,
without a clear electoral block it was unlikely that a strong finance minister could exist.  It was simply
too uncertain that parties would run together in future elections for them to delegate fiscal authority to
one individual who may favor one party over another.  During this time, while the government took
on the unions on pension reform, it did little to combat the deficit.
The caretaker Dini government that followed was unique because all the ministers in the
government were unelected (Sbragia 1999). The incentive to provide particularistic goods to ministry
constituencies, which is largely an electoral one, had been severed.  Indeed, as Figure 2 illustrates, the
Dini government took measures that stabilized the gross debt level. Yet there was no reason to believe
that these “technicians” could rule for any great length of time.  The technicians were also able only
to stabilize the debt level, not make any significant cuts.
Italy therefore entered 1996 with most observers convinced that the country would not
participate in EMU’s first wave.  As Chiorazzo and Spaventa (1999) note, at this time “the
probabilities assigned to Italy’s admission—even late admission—were slim when judged by markets,
nil in the eyes of our European partners, as well as of economist and opinion makers (pp. 2-3).”
                                                                                                                                                 
(states that are the so-called “pre-ins.”) See European Economy, Supplement A, Number 3, March 1999, which
is devoted to budgetary surveillance in EMU.26
Italy’s general government deficit was still 7.7% of GDP, or over double the Maastricht reference
value.
New elections were called in 1996, and this time the electoral system had a clear effect on the
electoral alliances in Italy and more generally on the composition of Italy’s budgetary institutions.
The political parties began to jell into two opposing blocks, one left-center and one center-right, after
the election in 1996, and the victorious Olive Tree was more coherent than Berlesconi’s coalition. The
only problem for the new government, and, as it turned out, it was a significant one, was that the
government needed the votes of the reformed communists (Rifondazione Comunista) in the Chamber of
Deputies because its majority was limited just to the Senate.  The reformed communists did not join the
government, but they could block bills in the Chamber of Deputies by siding with the right-leaning
opposition.
Soon after the Prodi government came to power, the state initiated an important reform in
1997 of the budget process both within the government and within the legislature. On the
governmental side, a legislative decree “increase[d] the autonomy of spending ministers and their
flexibility in budget management and control  (Felsen 1999, p. 13).” This move represented a
strengthening of the executive in its dealings with the legislature.  All else equal, however, this
change alone could potentially have had little effect if the common pool resource problem remained
significant within the cabinet. Giving spending ministers greater autonomy is only useful if the
ministers do not use it to carry out the same sorts of policies the legislature would have initiated on its
own.
Indeed, the most important reform followed the predictions of H2, namely a significant
strengthening of the treasury.  The reform incorporated the budget ministry into the treasury, creating
a so-called “super ministry.”  It also rationalized the structure of the ministry through several
administrative changes that made the bureaucracy more responsible to its leadership (Felsen 1999).
These reforms “further centralise[d] control over public expenditure in the hands of the executive
counterbalancing the increased autonomy of spending ministries…by more effective ‘guardian’
control over total expenditure (Felsen 1999, p. 15).”  In the context presented here, this reform
represented delegation of significant powers to the treasury minister.  The treasury can use these27
powers to reduce the common pool resource problem within the cabinet. The only outstanding and
independent “fiscal” ministry remained the Finance Ministry.21
The treasury minister used these powers to actively monitor spending that was passed, and he
had the right to withhold spending if departments did not follow correct procedures in order to turn
authorized spending in actual spending.  This was a noticeable change from the standard operating
procedures of the past where the treasury did not have this power (von Hagen 1992).  Indeed, there
are estimates that 70 trillion lire of authorized spending was not realized in 1996, and this amount
more than doubled to 180 trillion in 1997, and one of the principal reasons was Ciampi’s close
scrutiny of, and refusal to authorize, suspect spending (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 27,
1997).
A second significant change occurred within the legislature.  As noted above, the relative
power of the body vis-à-vis the government declined.  The budget process within the parliament was
also refined. Instead of voting on the over 5,000 items found in the budget bill, the budget was
reorganized according to “functional targets” and “base units (DeHaan, Moessen, and Volkerink
1999).” This measure streamlined the budget and made it more difficult for committees and individual
legislators to hide additional spending within the budget.
The predicted fiscal outcome is consistent with H4.  Italy qualified for EMU with a final
yearly deficit for 1998 of 2.7% of GDP.  In the final year before qualification, the country reduced its
general government deficit 4 percentage points, which represented “one of the largest annual
retrenchments recorded in the OECD area (OECD 1998).
Belgium 1990-98
Like in Italy, there was a strong consensus among political parties in Belgium that it was
essential for the country to be part of the first wave of EMU.  Yet it was still unclear how Belgium
would manage to get in.  Indeed, as late as 1995 the German Finance Minister, Theo Waigel, put
Belgium and the other states with weak deficit records on notice that there would be no exceptions for
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countries that did not meet the criteria (Jones 1998).  This section indicates that the road to fiscal
discipline was driven by truly credible fiscal contracts at the national level. Fiscal contracts between
the national and sub-national levels of government also played a critical role.  Unlike in Italy,
however, where the very structure of coalition government itself was changed, the types of coalitions
remained more or the same.  The major innovation was the strengthening of one institution, the High
Council of Finance, which both wrote the yearly fiscal contracts and monitored their execution.
The High Council of Finance (HCF) had existed since 1936, but it had previously served only
as an advisory body to the Ministry of Finance with little practical importance.  The newly constituted
HCF, which still remains in the same form today, has 30 members in full council, and it includes
representatives from the regions, the Ministries of Finance and of Budget, four other federal
ministries, outside experts in tax and fiscal matters, and officials at the central bank. The HCF is
broken down into three sections, and it is the section for fiscal policy that is most critical here.  It has
only ten members: one representative from the Ministry of Finance, six representatives from the three
regions, and, perhaps most importantly, the top three officials from the Bank of Belgium—the
Governor, Vice-Governor, and Senior Director.22 This section can recommend to the Minister of
Finance at its own initiative that the borrowing capacity of any level of government be curtailed.  It
also establishes fiscal targets for each level of government.
The HCF assumed a pivotal role after Maastricht, although it required more autonomy in
order to carry out its new functions. Parliament assigned the Council the role of monitoring the
compliance of each level of government to Belgium’s Convergence Plan in June 1992.  The stated
goal was for the general government debt burden to be reduced progressively to 3% by 1996, or one
year before the year that the Council of Ministers would use to decide participation in EMU. The HCF
was also the forum in which to decide the responsibilities of each level of government for reducing
the overall debt level. Indeed, because the regions received most of their money from federally
collected taxes, the regions were especially concerned with how the Convergence Plan targets were to
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be met. The agreement was that the real expenditure pattern of the regions should follow real growth
rates in the regions and a target figure for the real growth rate regional debts through the year 2000.
The execution of the agreement immediately proved problematic.  In 1992 the country headed
towards recession, and the recession affected the regions unequally.  The HCF, based on the
guidelines that new spending should largely follow economic growth, apportioned Flanders 1.25%
more spending, Brussels only .45% more, and Wallonia a cut in spending of .64%. Politically this was
unacceptable; Walloons, already experiencing a sharper hit from the recession, resented the increased
spending in Flanders, and the Wallonian regional government exceeded its spending target. Flanders
followed suit knowing that Wallonia was not sticking to its target, and the federal government overran
its spending limit in what was an election year.  Hence, no level of government met its target, and the
general government deficit was 6.9%, or 1.2% over the Convergence Plan’s target (Stienlet 1999, pp.
12-13).
Indeed, the initial failure of the respective governmental bodies to reign in spending alarmed
everyone.  Representatives of different levels of government agreed to reinforce the HCF.  They
required that the Council write a report every March on all levels of government that detailed whether
they had reached the targets of the previous year.  If the respective governments had not, this
notification was expected to be early enough to allow the offender to pass a supplementary budget
that reduced its deficit.  The levels of government were also expected to abide by the accounting rules
of the HCF, which were stricter than the ESA rules that the European Commission used.  Reaching
the HCF targets would therefore automatically get Belgium under Maastricht’s reference level of
3%.23  The HCF drew up new targets with the same stated aim of reaching the 3% level in 1996.
Most of the burden to adjust was placed on the federal government, which was expected to make 2/3
of the reduction in the general government deficit level.
From this point on the targets stuck.  Indeed, the federal government was forced to pass
repeated supplementary measures to meet the targets every year from 1992 to 1996, which together
represented over 6% of GDP (OECD 1999).  The final targets were set in 1996 for 1997.  The HCF30
proposed 2.8%, and for the first time, one of the levels of government differed from the HCF’s target
when the federal government demanded a deficit of exactly 3%, but even the compromise amount of
2.9% was overly pessimistic.  Because of stronger than expected economic growth, Belgium coasted
under the 3% reference level with a deficit of only 1.9%, a full percentage point below the target
(Conseil Superieur des Finances 1999).
It is useful to take a step back and to consider the role of the HCF more broadly within the
theoretical context presented here.  The HCF generally wrote the guidelines for the budget and set the
deficit targets for all levels of government during the critical four years before 1997.  In theory the
targets were “recommendations,” but in practice all levels of government adopted them unchanged
except for in 1996, and even then the differences in targets were minor.24  One should not forget, of
course, that representatives from the federal and regional governments sat in the key section of the
Council and participated in the decision-making, but this development still represented a change from
decision-making pre-1993.  The cabinet and, for that matter, the parliament were both by-passed in
the decision-making process.  Indeed, based on interviews the author conducted in Brussels of
officials at the regional, federal, and European Commission level, it is clear that all sides considered
the (non-elected) representatives from the Belgian National Bank to be the key players.  The federal
and regional representatives believed the bankers to be impartial brokers between the two levels of
government, and their suggestions were often incorporated into the Council’s recommendations.25
The perceived credibility of the bankers also carried over to the credibility of the Council’s
recommendations.  The only doubts about the targets arose in 1992-93 during Belgium’s recession,
and even then all parties quickly agreed to revise them.
The clear “stick” in the process was that no one level of government or political party wanted
to be accused of being responsible for the exclusion of Belgium from the first wave.  Once again this
was a change from the situation in the 1980’s, when each of Belgium’s regional parties refused to
                                                                                                                                                 
23 In particular, several public institutions are considered “enterprises” under ESA rules and hence do not count
towards deficit and debt levels, while they do count under HCF rules. Stienlet 1999, p. 16.
24 Interview at the Ministry of Finance 7/28/99.31
back down in the name of “budget discipline” to the other one. The episode in 1992-93 illustrated that
these regional cleavages still mattered, but all sides had a clear incentive to insure that the
“defections” did not happen again. Moreover, unlike in the Italian case, a failure to qualify for EMU
may have signaled the end of the country itself.  Regional leaders had been clamoring for more and
more competencies at their level, and a failure by the national government in particular could have
provided new ammunition for regional extremists who would like nothing better than to see the
federal government collapse (Jones 1998).
                                                                                                                                                 
25 The Central Bank also holds an informational advantage over the other participants in the Council. Contrary
to the practices of other European countries, the Central Bank itself prepares the national economic statistics on
which the debates are based.32


















































































Fitness of the Theory, Other Explanations, and Anomalous Findings
The analytic narrative framework asks us to examine whether the predictions of the theory
match the data, and to consider whether alternative explanations fare better. While the section above
integrates the predictions with the narrative, Table 1 summarizes the tests of the four hypotheses.  In
every case, the predicted institution matches the observed institution.
Other explanations fare less well. According to the electoral institutionalist perspective, Italy
should have improved its budgetary position after it introduced a more plurality-based system in
1994.  Indeed, Italy did fare better under the new system.  Yet the improvement was not noticeable
until after the introduction of new fiscal institutions. Deficits remained high under the first
government after the introduction of the electoral system, and only improved after the centralization
of decision-making power within the treasury.  Belgium runs counter to the predictions of the
approach.  With an unchanged electoral system, Belgium should have continued to have difficulties33
reducing its debts and deficits under proportional representation, but as the narrative indicated
Belgium succeeded in meeting the Maastricht criteria on its deficit level.
The explanation that focuses on external pressure is potentially more useful, and it requires a
careful consideration of the role of markets for each country and the role of the European Union.  It
seems clear that the countries would have both paid higher interest rate premia outside of EMU. In
Italy, for example, by the second half of 1995 “interest rate spreads came to depend on the
probabilities assigned by the markets to the prospect of joining the single currency at the outset
(Chiorazzo and Spaventa 1999, p. 12).”  The markets therefore punished Italy with higher interest
payments on its large outstanding debt as long as the markets believed that Italy would not get its act
together.
Yet, how much of the change in interest rates was due to economic fundamentals and how
much to the anticipated inclusion of the country in EMU is unclear.  Favero et. al. (1999) calculate
that, of the improvement of 214 basis point reduction between German and Italian forward rates from
March 1996 to 1997, only 65 basis points can be attributed to changing perceptions of Italy’s
likelihood of EMU participation.  Their research suggests that the interest rate premium Italy paid on
EMU exclusion was less than 1%. While this amount was certainly an increased cost for the country,
it can hardly be the sole reason why Italy reduced its deficit so dramatically.26
Even if one believes that Favero et al. (1999) understate the importance of the markets, the
narrative here demonstrates that the turnaround in the national budget, which incidentally also
lowered interest rates and made qualification for EMU that much easier through an improvement in
Italy’s economic fundamentals, happened only for the year 1997 during and after the government had
passed crucial reforms to the budgetary process.  It is likely that the strengthening of the Treasury
under Dr. Carlo Ciampi increased his, and his government’s, credibility with markets. Even a story
that includes a role for markets must therefore take into account changes in Italy’s budgetary
institutions.
                                               
26 These results are consistent with Mosley’s (1999) statistical examination of 15 developed democracies for the
period 1981-95 where she finds that every 1% decrease in the budget deficit reduces the interest rate on 10 year
government bonds by .05%. She also examines just the 1990’s but the results do not change substantively.34
The European Union also played a role as an external actor.  For Italy, certainly regular
reminders from Ecofin and from European Council meetings that Italy was unlikely to get in focused
the efforts of the Italian leadership.  Yet the Commission’s pressure did not in any sense make Italy’s
inclusion in EMU inevitable.  Indeed, the Commission itself anticipated that Italy would not make it.
As late as April 1997 press reports indicated that the Commission was privately telling Italy to
prepare for life outside of EMU in the first wave.27
The European Union role in Belgium is less obvious but still significant.  By simply
establishing the “stick” of exclusion from EMU, the European Union placed pressure on the federal
government especially to abide by the targets.  Moreover, meetings of the Ecofin Council to discuss
progress towards meeting the Maastricht criteria served as a constant reminder to the Minister of
Finance from his peers in other EU countries that the Belgian effort in the early years was not on-
target.  The Union’s designation of Belgium as an “excessive deficit” country was a public statement
that Belgium had not done enough. The establishment of a certain target of 3% of GDP by 1997 was
also a clear benchmark that had not existed before.  While there was already pressure inside the
country to do something about the high deficits, it is doubtful that Belgium would have made cuts in
spending and raised taxes as quickly and as deeply without the 3% target.28  Because the target was
for “general” rather than simply “central” government debt, it was imperative that the state find a
solution to its budget troubles that included all levels of government, and, as one official in the
Flemish regional government put it, the HFC became “the natural institution to use” once Maastricht
was agreed upon.29
Yet, it is reasonable to conclude that it was the HCF, rather than the monitoring that the
Commission provided, that was most important to the success of the fiscal contracts in Belgium.  The
players themselves monitored each other through this forum and laid the path for how to get below
the magical 3%.   The Union’s role was to set the ultimate target at the end of the period and to
provide the stick if one or more levels of government failed to keep its target set in the HCF.
                                               
27 See “Italy Out in EMU Cold,” The European, April 10, 1997, and “Rome’s Euro Prospects Sinking,” The
Guardian, April 17, 1997.
28 An official at the Federal Finance Ministry admitted as much to the author.  July 28, 1999.35
In sum, each of these arguments has a contribution to make to the theory, and indeed they
explain some of the dynamics of the model.  The markets were important because they affected the
costs of not imposing fiscal discipline.  Interest rate payments on outstanding debt, which was
considerable for both countries, would certainly have been higher without EMU participation.
Likewise, the European Union assured higher political costs for both countries, and it provided some
monitoring of the budget situations in each state. Yet by themselves they do not explain the changes
we observe.
It is also important to consider the extent to which the theory presented here is deficient.
First, the theory does a poor job of explaining why  the states made the larger, macro-level changes
they did. It is much better explaining the course that the reforms took.  In the Belgian case the state
federalized itself in 1989, and the actors at all levels relied upon an institution to set and coordinate
their budget targets for them, while in Italy a new electoral system in 1994 led to changing coalitions
and changing feasible budgetary institutions. The initial changes are generally outside of the model—
Belgium federalized in response to more general tension between Flemings and Walloons, while the
change in the Italian electoral system had more to do with the collapse of communism and the “clean
hands” campaign than with any desire to improve fiscal policy. A “punctuated equilibrium approach”
may be more appropriate here, and it may begin to consider the role of external pressure in changing
the more general institutional framework in which the budgetary institutions are determined.  As
Sbragia (1999) explains for Italy, “both geopolitical [especially the collapse of communism] and
European Union (EMS and Maastricht) forces ‘punctuated’ the existing equilibrium of Italian politics
and society” and led to the initial institutional changes that structured the budgetary institutions
adopted later.
Second, the theory does not explain the growing importance of sub-national budgetary
institutions and governments.  As the narrative illustrated, both countries hardened the budget
constraints on sub-national governments. While this action was a response to the Maastricht Treaty’s
focus on general government debt instead of central government debt, the theory does not explain
what actions governments should take nor how different forms of national-sub-national relationships
                                                                                                                                                 
29 Interview at the Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, July 9, 1998.36
should affect the course of those reforms.  Given that the central governments made most of the
adjustments to get the deficit levels below 3% this oversight does not detract from the narrative, but it
does indicate that more research needs to be done to take into account all levels of government.
Finally, the theory also ignores the game played between the cabinet and parliament.  While it
is clear that important institutional reforms in both countries strengthened the government’s hand vis-
à-vis parliament (Belgium in 1993 and Italy in 1997), there is not the space in this paper to explain
why this change is important theoretically or to explain in detail what the changes were.  The reader is
asked to consult other papers by the author if she would like to learn more about the parliamentary
stage.30 What can be said briefly, however, is that the changes reinforced the significant institutional
changes within the government, and there is little additional value added to including these details in a
paper of this length.
Conclusion
This paper illustrates how the two EU countries with the worst deficit and debt problems in
1991 still managed to join the first wave of EMU. In both cases, adequate institutions to reduce the
common pool resource problems within the cabinet were lacking.  Significant institutional reform was
necessary to break the logjam.  In the Italian case, after the first elections under the new electoral
system, delegation to a strong finance minister became feasible at the governmental stage.  In the
Belgian case, a body outside of the cabinet, the High Council of Finance, set the targets, and the
expectation that Belgium would be excluded if any of the parties failed to adhere to them was a strong
stick to keep spending ministers within their mandates.
The reason why the new budgetary institutions stuck, however, is related to Maastricht—it
was important enough for politicians to join EMU that they agreed to the institutions, and once again
the “stick” of the European Union enters the scene. If this is the case, however, then one cannot be as
optimistic about the future of budget policy once states qualified.  Finance ministers led by Theo
Waigel publicly recognized this problem, of course, and passed the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997
                                               
30 In particular, see Hallerberg (1999), Hallerberg (1998).37
in an effort to give these states new incentives to keep up their newly found frugality.  This Pact
institutionalized the monitoring function of the Commission, and it creates new sticks in the form of
fines for states that do not correct their deficits once they exceed the 3% reference value.
Yet there is a fundamental question about how long both states can continue the centralization
of their budget policies.  Indeed, Fabbrini (1999) notes pessimistically that “the reduction of the
public debt…has been made possible by the contingent suspension of ordinary parliamentary life (and
not by a permanent empowerment of the executive),” and he adds that “as soon as Italy entered the
Euro, the old distributive coalitions started to [appear] again (p. 33).” Whether these old coalitions
will have any effect depends on the permanence of the new fiscal institutions.  The Italian government
in July 1999 proposed a further strengthening of the Treasury by combining it with the Finance
Ministry, but whether the decision will ultimately be approved next year is unclear.  In Belgium’s
case, the institutional arrangement appears set so long as the economy is healthy.  A gale of bad
economic results, however, could push the High Council of Finance off track.
More broadly, the analytic narrative approach asks us to consider whether the lessons drawn
from the two cases discussed here are generalizable to other cases.  Every state has its own
particularities, but the narratives presented here are instructive for governments that wish to get their
budgets under control.  A direct lesson of the theory is that there are different roads to fiscal
discipline, but other institutions, in particular whether the government has one or multiple veto
players, predetermine the route the country will take.   Pressure from outside the country can be
helpful in changing the penalties for defections, but ultimately the country itself must remove its own
institutional roadblocks. These lessons may be especially applicable in East European countries as
they prepare for European Union membership and eventual participation in Economic and Monetary
Union.38
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